Formal Rationality and Limited Agents
Jonathan King Tash
Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720
tash@cs.berkeley.edu
Abstract
Many efforts have been made to use normative theories of rational
decision-making, such as Bayesian decision theory, to construct and model
agents exhibiting intelligent behavior. In order to accommodate agents
possessing only limited computational resources to apply to their decision
making, however, a significant change is required in how the role of formal
rationality is to be viewed. This paper argues that rationality is best
seen as a property of the relationship between the agent and a designer.
Such a perspective has several consequences for the design and modelling of
agents, bearing on assessment of rationality, induction, reactivity, and
metalevel control. It also illuminates several concerns put forth by
critics of the work of the artificial intelligence community.
Appeared in
Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive
Science Society, 1994. Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., pp. 854-857
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